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TORTURE, NECESSITY, AND SUPREME
EMERGENCY: LAW AND MORALITY AT THE
END OF LAW
Zachary R. Calo∗
I. INTRODUCTION
“Torture[,]” Jean Bethke Elshtain writes, “invariably appears on the
‘never’ list of the ‘forbiddens’ of human politics.”1 Few issues, after all,
are more settled in law and ethics than torture. As one commentator
notes, “no other practice except slavery is so universally condemned in
law and human convention as torture.”2 Torture is a practice that Cesare
Beccaria, in a statement reflective of the new Enlightenment morality of
the eighteenth century, denounced as a “residue of the most barbarous
centuries[.]”3 “[T]he eradication of the moral and legal basis for
torture[,]” Christopher Kutz writes, “has been one of the defining
features of post-Enlightenment liberal politics.”4
Freedom from
government torture is now unquestionably established as a foundational
human right. Indeed, the importance and clarity of the prohibition
against torture is most evident from its seminal role in the modern
human rights movement. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the founding document of the movement, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establish that no person shall be
subjected to torture. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment elaborates on this
principle in a singular document, further emphasizing the defining role
that this issue has had in the human rights movement. Enlightenment
political ideals, fulfilled in the idea of universal human rights, have
embraced the principle that torture must be prohibited absolutely and
unqualifiedly.
In addition to its particular role in the human rights movement,
opposition to torture also has been of seminal importance in constructing
the liberal political imagination. As David Luban argues, torture is
∗
Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. Ph.D. candidate,
University of Virginia; Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Virginia
School of Law; M.A., The Johns Hopkins University; B.A., The Johns Hopkins University.
1
Jean Bethke Elshtain, Reflection on the Problem of “Dirty Hands,” in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION 77 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
2
John Alan Cohan, Torture and the Necessity Doctrine, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1588 (2007).
3
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 3 (Richard
Bellamy ed., 2003).
4
Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235, 239
(2007).
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fundamentally at odds with the liberal vision of politics and humanity
because of the relationship it creates between torturer and victim: “The
self-conscious aim of torture is to turn its victim into someone who is
isolated, overwhelmed, terrorized, and humiliated. Torture aims to strip
away from its victim all the qualities of human dignity that liberalism
prizes.”5 “Liberalism[,]” by contrast, “incorporates a vision of engaged,
active human beings possessing an inherent dignity regardless of their
social situation. The victim of torture is in every respect the opposite of
this vision.”6 In fact, far from merely being in tension with liberal ideals,
torture serves as a practice against which these ideals were defined and
established. As Michael Ignatieff remarked, “There is not much doubt
that liberal democracy’s very history and identity is tied up in an
absolute prohibition of torture.”7
Opposition to torture has found a voice not merely in the secular
morality of modernity, but also in religious traditions.8 The human
rights movement has drawn deeply from the well of theological thought,
even if unknowingly or unwittingly, particularly with respect to notions
of human dignity.9 Of course, religious traditions have had a far-fromconsistent message on torture. As Jeremy Waldron notes, “Torture
historically has not always been beyond the pale from a Christian point
of view.”10 Yet, it must be said that the ethical imperative against torture
which has acquired such currency in the modern period is as much due
to the labors of religious communities as it is to the high politics of
human rights. Lutheran theologian Helmut Thielicke, writing in the
mid-twentieth century, offered the following comment on torture: “If we
make ourselves fundamentally unpredictable, i.e., if as Christians we
think that torture is at least conceivable—perhaps under the exigencies
of an extreme situation—we thereby reduce man to the worth of a
convertible means, divest him of the imago Dei, and so deny the first
commandment.”11 “Eternal as well as temporal issues” are at stake in

5
David Luban, Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Time Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1430
(2005).
6
Id. at 1433.
7
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 136
(2004).
8
On religion and human rights, see WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, TORTURE AND EUCHARIST
(1998); TORTURE IS A MORAL ISSUE: CHRISTIANS, JEWS, MUSLIMS, AND PEOPLE OF CONSCIENCE
SPEAK OUT (George Hunsinger ed., 2008).
9
John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5–6
(1996).
10
Jeremy Waldron, The Injury Done by Christian Silence to Public Debate over America’s Use
of Torture, 2 J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE 1, 10 (2008).
11
HELMUT THIELICKE, THEOLOGICAL ETHICS, VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS 646 (1966).
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the issue of torture, Thielicke concludes.12 The Catechism of the Catholic
Church similarly provides that, “Torture which uses physical or moral
violence to extract confessions, punish the guilty, frighten opponents, or
satisfy hatred is contrary to respect for the person and for human
dignity.”13
In law and ethics, and in worldviews, secular and sacred, opposition
to torture has found clear expression unrivaled in the modern period.
This principled opposition both reflects, and in no small measure helped
to establish, the parameters of liberal politics. The seminality of this
principle makes the recent debate over torture’s permissibility all the
more astounding. No respectable thinker would propose reexamining
laws concerning the rights of racial minorities or women, both of which
have had an equally significant role in the drama of liberal politics. Yet,
many thoughtful and morally serious thinkers have proposed that there
might be circumstances in which torture is legally and morally
permissible. In fact, Thomas Crocker has gone so far as to propose that
“substantial academic consensus may exist that in extreme circumstances
one could imagine justifying the practice of torture as a lesser evil to
avoid the greater evil of many thousands, or even millions, of innocent
deaths.”14 What accounts for this seeming blind spot in the principled
liberalism for which opposition to torture has been a sine qua non? As
David Luban has compellingly argued, intelligence gathering “is the
only rationale for torture that liberal political culture admits could even
possibly be legitimate.”15
When confronted with a “looming
catastrophe,” captured most vividly in the ticking time bomb scenario,
many liberals are unable to sustain their principled rights-based
opposition to torture.16 Torture under conditions of necessity, notes one
commentator, “poses a dramatic challenge to our personal beliefs about
right and wrong[.]”17 Thus, while most liberals support the principle
that freedom from torture is a fundamental and inviolable human right,
they are unable to reject in toto the argument that torture might be
permissible “in gravely dangerous situations[.]”18
Given the challenge that exigent political circumstances pose to
liberal principles, it is not surprising that the topic of necessity has been
Id. at 647.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2297 (rev. ed. 1994).
14
Thomas Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of Constitutional Culture,
61 SMU L. REV. 2 (2008).
15
See Luban, supra note 5, at 1436.
16
Id. at 1439.
17
Paola Gaeta, May Necessity Be Available as a Defense for Torture in the Interrogation of
Suspected Terrorists?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 786 (2004).
18
See Luban, supra note 5, at 1436.
12
13
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perhaps the most important and contested aspect of the torture debate.
The topic most commonly arises in the context of considering whether
necessity justifies the illegal actions of a government official who
authorized torture under conditions of grave danger. As John Alan
Cohan observes, “Much of the extensive commentary on [torture] has
alluded to the necessity doctrine as justification for torturing a suspect
who likely has information concerning a ‘ticking bomb[.]’”19 In this
respect, the debate over torture and necessity is not narrowly about
torture, but also about the authority of legal norms and the implications
of exigent political circumstances, and is ultimately about the nature of
liberalism itself.
The concern of this Article is not primarily with the particulars of
this scholarly debate, but it is important that a brief survey of
representative positions be offered. In general, the debate about torture
and necessity features two competing positions. The first line of
argument proposes that necessity defeats the binding prohibition against
government-sanctioned torture. A number of arguments have been
advanced in support of this principle. Judge Richard Posner, for one,
argues that with respect to using torture to “ward off a great evil[,]” the
law should “trust public officers to perceive and act on a moral duty that
is higher than their legal duty.”20 Confronted with a situation in which
torture was the only available means of potentially “averting the death
of thousands, even millions,” the political leader would have “the moral
and political duty” to authorize torture.21 This duty, he adds, is found in
the law of necessity, “understood not as law but as the trumping of law
by necessity[.]”22 It is this law of necessity which “justifie[s]” extralegal
action by political officials.23 Posner does not address with specificity the
procedure by which this justification becomes operative, though the clear
thrust of his argument is that the president should not be subject to
criminal punishment if torture was sanctioned under true conditions of
necessity. The law of necessity thus represents for Posner a supervening
legal principle to which the “law must adjust” in times of emergency.24
Posner justifies torture during emergency situations by relying on a
law of necessity rooted in the Constitution and the inherent authority of
the Executive. Other commentators, by contrast, have argued for
utilizing the criminal law defense of necessity which establishes that
See Cohan, supra note 2, at 1587.
RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY 85 (2006).
21
Id. at 86.
22
Id. at 158.
23
Id.
24
Id.
19
20
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“[s]ome acts that would otherwise be wrong are rendered rightful by a
good purpose, or by the necessity of choosing the lesser of two evils.”25
This line of argument has been adopted, in more or less similar form, by
a number of commentators. John Alan Cohan, for instance, concludes
“that the way to handle torture in an extreme emergency is to recognize
that, while torture is prohibited, necessity provides an overriding
justification under the circumstances.”26
Adam Raviv similarly
concludes, “The defense of necessity or justification can serve as an
effective means of policing the extreme interrogation of terrorism
suspects in ticking bomb situations.”27 Offering yet another expression
of this perspective, John Parry argues that, “If torture provides the last
remaining chance to save lives in imminent peril, the necessity defense
should be available to justify the interrogators’ conduct.”28 Parry further
develops this claim in an article co-authored with Welsh White. While
acknowledging that “[t]orture is categorically illegal under international
law, the federal Constitution and statutes, and state law[,]” White and
Parry argue that the “necessity defense should be available” for any
government agent prosecuted for torturing under conditions of danger
in order “to gain information that would avert a future terrorist act[.]”29
They emphasize that torture should remain illegal. Torture, they argue,
remains wrong in most all circumstances and, for reasons both “moral
and pragmatic[]” should not be brought within the purview of lawful
activity.30 Their proposal for permitting the necessity defense in select
situations thus differs fundamentally from Alan Dershowitz’s oftcommented upon torture warrant proposal, which would bring
authorized torture within the bounds of law. Yet, even while torture
remains outside of law, the defense of necessity, when applicable,
provides an excuse from criminal punishment.
Against the argument that necessity justifies torture is the contrary
claim that the prohibition against torture binds political officials
regardless of circumstance. For proponents of this view, the legal
prohibition against torture cannot be conditional, but rather binds

John Alan Cohan, Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism, 35 STETSON L. REV. 903, 905
(2006) (quoting GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 198
(1957)).
26
See Cohan, supra note 2, at 1631.
27
Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: Defending the Indefensible, 13 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 135, 157 (2004).
28
John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and Abroad, in
TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 158.
29
John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an
Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 761, 764 (2002).
30
Id. at 762.
25
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universally, regardless of the exigencies of a particular moment. That
necessity offers no justification for torture is clearly established in
international law. One scholar summarizes the matter in stating that
“the right not to be subjected to torture cannot be derogated from, in any
circumstances. No emergency situation may allow a state to suspend or
curtail this fundamental right. In international criminal law[,] torture is
banned, both in times of peace and in times of war[.]”31 Yet, more
significant even than the unconditional prohibition of torture in
international law is the superstructural role this principle has in
upholding the integrity and coherence of all liberal rights. The
prohibition against torture is foundational to a rights-based political
regime, and to whittle away at this prohibition harms the moral
authority of liberalism and the political value of all rights. The efficacy
of liberalism, it is maintained, is derived from a deontological
commitment to certain human rights from which no derogation is
permissible. To excuse torture in difficult cases undermines all rights.
The argument that necessity cannot override the prohibition against
torture rests on general claims about the authority of law in emergency
situations, but also reflects views about the particularly abhorrent nature
of torture. Scholars have long debated the question of whether and why
torture is different than other forms of violence.32 The argument that
torture is different, and thus justly prohibited by law without exception,
generally considers the damage done to both victim and torturer.
Michael Ignatieff, for one, has argued that “[a]n absolute prohibition is
legitimate because in practice such a prohibition relieves a state’s public
servants from the burden of making intolerable choices, ones that inflict
irremediable harm both on our enemies and on themselves, on those
charged with our defense.”33 Jeremy Waldron has similarly considered
the ways in which religious notions of human dignity make torture
distinctly problematic.34 What is interesting, however, is that the belief
that torture undermines and threatens our moral traditions in a
particularly violent way supports the argument that the legal ban must
remain sacrosanct. Christopher Kutz summarizes this line of thinking in
writing that
[n]ecessity really does justify overriding some kinds of
rights claims in many instances, but these are rights of a

See Gaeta, supra note 17, at 787.
See Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 124–43 (1978), for an important
contribution to this debate.
33
IGNATIEFF, supra note 7, at 142.
34
See generally Waldron, supra note 10.
31
32
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fundamentally different nature from the ones involved
in the ticking-bomb example. Criminal theorists have
over-generalized the appropriate normative scope of the
necessity defense by confusing those rights whose
abrogation the defense can legitimately justify with all
rights.35
Waldron makes a similar claim that the legal absolute is appropriate
for torture because “certain things might just be repugnant to the spirit
of our law, and . . . torture may be one of them.”36 He proceeds to argue
that torture holds an “emblematic” and “archetyp[ical]” role within “the
spirit of our law[.]”37 Thomas Crocker echoes similar themes in arguing
that permitting torture under necessity “alters the structure of
constitutional commitments with consequences that are difficult to
predict or imagine.” Such an action undermines the “fundamental
dignity, autonomy, and liberty of persons” which is the foundation of
“constitutional culture.”38 While necessity might justify certain actions,
the prohibition of torture is so central to democratic liberal principles
that exigent political circumstances cannot justify derogation.
This paper proposes that neither of these two lines of argument
proves ultimately satisfying. The argument that law must bind
unconditionally, even in the midst of an emergency situation, fails to
reckon with the limits of law or, as Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule
claim, fails “to come to grips with the inevitability of tragic choices.”39
This position attempts to bind politics within law in a way that fails to
account for the possibility of moments for which law cannot provide an
adequate response. As Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote from prison during
World War II,
In the course of historical life there comes a point where
the exact observance of the formal law of a
state . . . suddenly finds itself in violent conflict with the
ineluctable necessities of the lives of men; at this point
responsible and pertinent action leaves behind it the
domain of principle and convention, the domain of the
Kutz, supra note 4, at 257.
Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1717 (2005).
37
Id. at 1717 (discussing the emblematic idea); id. at 1748 (discussing the archetype and
spirit of our law themes).
38
Crocker, supra note 14.
39
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 671, 677 (2006).
35
36
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normal and regular, and is confronted by the
extraordinary situation of ultimate necessities, a
situation which no law can control.40
The argument that law must bind applies ordinary legal logic to a
state of affairs that lies beyond legal rationality. At the same time, the
argument that political necessity excuses torture fails to take seriously
the implications of this action. To countenance torture and bring it
within the bounds of lawful conduct not only undermines foundational
legal norms but assaults the moral order and humanistic achievements
on which civilization depends.
In short, those arguing for a
deontological approach to torture fail to take necessity seriously enough,
and those arguing for a utilitarian approach to torture do not take order
seriously enough.
This Article offers an alternative to these dominant lines of debate in
the form of Michael Walzer’s account of supreme emergency. Walzer
does not specifically address the question of supreme emergency to
torture, but his writing on this subject, first developed over three
decades ago, engages issues now being considered again in the torture
debate. His perspective, in broad outline, provides that extreme
circumstances might require political officials to violate legal norms. At
the same time, he does not locate the principle of necessity within law,
nor does he establish necessity as an excuse to legal punishment. To do
so, he implies, would domesticate a moment properly understood as
participating in the darkness of political tragedy. In his most important
claim, Walzer instead presents necessity as an ethical concept that
derives its meaning from the obligations among persons in political
community. By neither denying the reality of necessity nor locating
necessity within law, Walzer reframes the debate about legal authority
and political action in the midst of crisis.
One might question the value of this project for our present moment.
As David Luban writes,
The real torture debate . . . isn’t about whether to throw
out the rulebook in the exceptional emergencies. Rather,
it’s about what the rulebook says about the ordinary
interrogation—about whether you can shoot up Qatani
with saline solution to make him urinate on himself, or

40

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christ, the Church, and the World, in THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
559 (1979).

FOR MINISTRY
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threaten him with dogs in order to find out whether he
ever met Osama bin Laden.41
Would our public and academic discourse not be better served by
clarifying foundational legal principles rather than obfuscating the
debate with theoretical speculation? I do not disagree with Luban’s
assessment of the central challenges in the torture debate. Yet, we
should not embrace an overly narrow account of the “real” issues, for
there is not the stark divide Luban implies between “real” and
“exceptional” circumstances. In the end, it is important to consider law’s
authority during exceptional circumstances as a means of clarifying the
scope of law’s authority during more ordinary times. The debate about
torture and necessity has raised foundational questions about the nature
of law within a liberal democracy premised on the priority of human
rights. The opening provided by this moment of political reflection
should not be dismissed. Walzer’s thought is thus not offered as a
substitute for thinking about more technical questions of legal
interpretation. It is offered as a way of clarifying this analysis. By
pushing law’s authority to its limits, we can better define the principles
which govern legal rationality in ordinary time. Hard cases perhaps
make bad law, but hard cases also force us to confront our assumptions
about the meaning of liberalism at its limits.
II. “SUPREME EMERGENCY” AND THE OVERRIDING OF LAW
Walzer’s most important work on necessity appears in the context of
his writing on “supreme emergency.” Walzer, it should be noted, does
not typically use the language of necessity, nor does he write as a legal
scholar concerned with such matters as executive authority or the
criminal law defense of necessity. A political philosopher, Walzer
develops the concept of supreme emergency in the course of examining
whether it is permissible to target civilian populations during a just
war.42 His response, in brief, is that during a supreme emergency it
might be permissible, perhaps obligatory, that a political leader take
actions that “override the rights of innocent people and shatter the war
convention.”43
Walzer defines supreme emergency in exceedingly narrow terms.
His aim is to establish “radical limits to the notion of necessity” and to
41
David Luban, Torture, American-Style, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2005, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/25/AR2005112501552.html.
42
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977) (Walzer first took up this question in
his 1977 book, Just and Unjust Wars).
43
Id. at 259.
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remove the concept as far as possible from the reality of ordinary
politics.44 A supreme emergency exists, he thus writes, only “when our
deepest values and our collective survival are in imminent danger[.]”45
The existence of this state of affairs is determined by reference to the
imminence and nature of a threat.46 Neither criterion alone is sufficient
to give rise to a supreme emergency.
Only a threat that is
simultaneously both imminent and of extreme danger might be termed a
supreme emergency. The threat, in short, must be “of an unusual and
horrifying kind.”47
There is a certain imprecision to this definition of supreme
emergency, as there unavoidably must be. As a result, Walzer turns to
historical examples, in particular, the Nazi threat to England between
1940 and 1942, to illustrate supreme emergency. Nazism, Walzer writes,
“was a threat to human values so radical that its imminence would
surely constitute a supreme emergency[.]”48 It is only when confronted
by an “ultimate horror[]” such as this that the “rule of necessity” permits
violating the rights of others in order to “save a nation[.]”49 It is in light
of this principle that Walzer concludes that the British bombing of
German civilian targets was permissible.50 Yet, Walzer adds that the
circumstances had so changed after 1942 that this conduct was no longer
permitted.51
The supreme emergency had ended.
Absent this
precondition, it was no longer morally permissible “to override the
rights of innocent people” for the sake of national preservation.52 On this
point Walzer is particularly clear: extralegal action that violates human
rights cannot be justified simply to minimize losses or hasten the end of
conflict.53 For these reasons, Walzer concludes that the bombing of
Hiroshima was without justification. Only when a threat is truly
civilizational in nature—that is, when it threatens to destroy the nation’s
“commitment to continuity across generations”—does acting outside of
law become a possibility.54
Id. at 261.
MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 33 (2004).
46
WALZER, supra note 42, at 252.
47
Id. at 253.
48
Id. at 253.
49
Id. at 254.
50
Id. at 261.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 259.
53
Id. at 266.
54
WALZER, supra note 45, at 43. Walzer does not specifically address the scope of the
warrant to act outside the law, nor the process by which a political official determines
which rules might be overridden. It seems clear, however, that a political official should
limit extralegal action as much as is practicable and should only violate a law when doing
44
45
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During supreme emergency, necessity becomes the rule against
which ordinary laws are judged. The “rule of necessity” provides the
“highest values” to which the leader is obligated.55 It is thus no longer
fidelity to law, but fidelity to a higher order of responsibility that defines
the vocation of the political official. However, if supreme emergency
warrants political officials to operate without regard to ordinarily
binding legal norms, what becomes of law’s authority? Does the rule of
necessity negate the legal principles that govern political conduct under
ordinary circumstances? Walzer’s response to these questions most
vividly reveals the relationship between supreme emergency and the
approaches to necessity offered in the torture debate referenced above.
Walzer’s position is that law does not bind during a supreme
emergency because ordinary legal logic ceases to meaningfully address
the strained state of affairs. Supreme emergency, he writes, “describes
those rare moments when the negative value that we assign—that we
can’t help assigning—to the disaster that looms before us devalues
morality itself and leaves us free to do what is militarily necessary to
avoid the disaster[.]”56 During these uncommon situations, the “rights
normality[,]” which ordinarily binds political conduct, ceases to hold
value. The “moral stakes” are simply too high for ordinary rules.57 In
making such claims, however, Walzer does not argue that supreme
emergency negates the validity of the underlying legal norm. The norm
remains valid. It is rather that the exigencies of the moment compel
fidelity to a higher rule of necessity. The rule of necessity has greater
pull than the ordinary laws of the state, yet the rule exists outside of law.
It is not a principle within law. It is other than law. As such, the
demands of law remain incontrovertible even as radically contingent
circumstances require deviation from law. In Walzer’s phraseology, a
supreme emergency requires that laws be “overridden” but not be “set

so is necessary to the immediate objective of overcoming the threat posed by supreme
emergency. Walzer’s case study of bombing civilian targets seemingly indicates that the
decision to inflict unlawful violence against others must be assessed in a fact specific
manner. The warrant which a leader acquires during supreme emergency to violate laws is
not a blanket authority. The leader is not transmuted by virtue of necessity into an
unalloyed sovereign who might act without respect to the bindingness of law. The ruler
remains embedded within the web of the law, and a decision to authorize violence that
operates against these norms must emerge out of a deliberate and morally serious process
of reflection.
55
WALZER, supra note 42, at 254.
56
WALZER, supra note 45, at 40.
57
Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, supra note 1, at 73.
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aside, canceled, or annulled.”58 This arrangement, Walzer often notes, is
similar to civil disobedience.59
By characterizing the rule of necessity in this way, Walzer refuses to
grant supreme emergency any final autonomy. The rule of necessity
remains an aberration, even as it operates authoritatively. As a
consequence, the rule of necessity does not free political officials from
judgment for the extralegal actions they authorize during a supreme
emergency. Necessity for Walzer is not a supervening legal norm that
excuses judgment. It is a temporary warrant which permits the ruler to
operate apart from law, in a parallel source of authority. But the rule of
necessity must ultimately return to the law as it operates in ordinary
time. Freedom and limitation exist in creative tension during supreme
emergency. The ruler who acts in contravention of law does so with
freedom from the immediate bounds of law, yet cannot escape the final
judgment of law. The rule of necessity is not an end in itself, but finds its
ultimate resolution only in a return to law that inaugurates judgment
upon actions taken in supreme emergency. Although Walzer does not
“defend any particular view on punishment[,]” warranted extralegal
action undertaken during supreme emergency is necessarily paired with
guilt and judgment.60 Through the return to law, the authority of the
legal order is upheld and the moral order is restored.
In upholding the authority of law, even as it is temporarily
overridden by the rule of necessity, Walzer develops a fundamentally
different perspective from those who define necessity as excuse and
justification. As discussed above, those advancing this latter position
argue that the binding authority of law is defeated by a superior legal
principle of necessity. The prohibition against torture thus has no effect
when violated under certain conditions of necessity. For Walzer, on the
other hand, the temporary silence of law during supreme emergency
does not negate law but rather triggers a search for a source of political
authority outside of law.
Walzer finds the authority to act in
contravention of law in the realm of ethics and, in particular, in the
Id. at 68.
Id. at 72.
60
Id. at 73. Although Walzer refers here to formal legal punishment, he speaks of
punishment in broader terms. In fact, he adds,
Moral rules are not usually enforced against the sort of actor I am
considering, largely because he acts in an official capacity. . . . In any
case, there seems no way to establish or enforce the punishment. Short
of the priest and the confessional, there are no authorities to whom we
might entrust the task.
Walzer illustrates this process of judgment in his discussion of the “[d]ishonoring” of
Arthur Harris, who directed the bombing of Germany from 1942 until the end of the war.
WALZER, supra note 42, at 323–25.
58
59

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss4/3

Calo: Torture, Necessity, and Supreme Emergency: Law and Morality at th

2009]

Torture, Necessity, and Supreme Emergency

1603

obligations among persons in community. Walzer’s account of the
enduring authority of the legal norm during supreme emergency thus
rests on a broader claim about the relationship between law and morality
during supreme emergency. It is to this subject that this Article now
turns.
III. LAW, JUDGMENT, AND THE RESTORATION OF MORAL ORDER
A. Law and Morality in Supreme Emergency
Much of the debate concerning torture focuses on the question of
whether there exists a legal principle that warrants illegal actions under
conditions of necessity. For Walzer, by contrast, necessity is best
understood as a moral rather than legal category. Above all, the warrant
for acting outside law during a supreme emergency is not based in a
legal principle but rather in supra-legal moral obligations that inform
political life. In short, this Article proposes that supreme emergency
rests on establishing law and morality as distinct loci of political
authority, with the latter providing the content of responsible action
during conditions of necessity. As such, Walzer shifts the discussion of
necessity from law to morality.
This division between law and morality is pertinent only during
supreme emergency. Under ordinary political circumstances, the public
obligations of an official are determined solely by the requirements of
law. Moral obligations possess no authority under such conditions to
warrant official action in contravention of the law.
Law binds
unconditionally. In this respect, it is law’s morality that must guide
officials during ordinary time. In an earlier essay, for instance, Walzer
describes the duties of state officials in terms of acting solely within the
bounds of law: “The state can thus be described as a purely external
limit on group action, but it must be added that the precise point at
which the limit becomes effective cannot be left for state officials to
decide. For them, the law must be the limit.”61
Walzer advances a broadly positivistic conception of law, at least
insofar as he presents law as categorically distinct from morality. At the
same time, Walzer views law and morality as necessarily intertwined
within the economy of political decision-making. Law, in this respect, is
not subject to morality, nor does it lack significant points of contact with
morality. A full account of politics must take account of both. This is
above all the case during conditions of necessity, which gives rise to
61
Michael Walzer, The Obligation To Disobey the Law, in LAW AND MORALITY 129, 140
(Don Welch ed., 1987).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 4 [2009], Art. 3

1604 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

circumstances in which law and morality create dissonant obligations.
In particular, the situation creates tension between the obligation to law
and the obligation to prevent “nullification” of the community.62 Stated
differently, supreme emergency creates conflict between laws “founded
on a conception of rights that transcends all immediate considerations[]”
and the existential demands of supreme emergency that transcend the
ordinary bounds of political life.63
It is impossible to simultaneously uphold both obligations. While in
ordinary time, a leader defers to the binding norms of law, during
supreme emergency a leader might be required to follow obligations to
the community. Thus, there is a tension, indeed a vocational dissonance,
at the existential fringes of politics. Law alone cannot offer a full account
of political obligation in this moment, and only by opening law to the
demands of morality can the crisis be understood.
Even as the source of authority during supreme emergency shifts
from law to morality, law continues to establish obligations to which all
are subject. Supreme emergency does not negate law or create a zone of
autonomy within which a political leader can operate without regard to
the law. Nor is political necessity an excuse that lifts the judgment upon
those actions that violate law. Rather, during supreme emergency, law
and morality exist as dueling and equally authoritative loci of authority.
What has changed is that the higher vocation of moral obligation
temporarily grants officials the warrant, and perhaps the obligation, to
act contrary to law.
B. The Ties That Bind: The Sources of Moral Obligation
By locating necessity within the sphere of moral obligation, Walzer
avoids equating necessity with lawlessness. Rather, extralegal action
taken during supreme emergency is simultaneously warranted and
unlawful. Such acts therefore stand between the yes and the no of
history—between the transcendent demands of necessity and the norms
of law established in ordinary time. Even as necessity calls forth the
need to act in contravention of law, law stands in judgment of this
decision. As such, the ruler upon whom the necessity of extralegal
action is placed must “accept the burdens of criminality[.]”64
Justifying the authority of moral obligation within Walzer’s scheme
requires understanding what Walzer means by moral obligation. When
Walzer refers to moral obligation, he is not speaking of an ethereal code,
62
63
64
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nor is he writing about the subjective moral beliefs a person holds.
Rather, Walzer’s account of moral obligation emerges out of his
understanding of community.65 A moral obligation in the realm of
politics derives its efficacy from the communitarian relations among
persons. The act of necessity, in other words, cannot be isolated from the
moral logic of the community. Political officials, even just officials who
make the tragic decision to override law, do not stand outside the moral
community of which they are a part. The moral life, Walzer notes, is a
“social phenomenon[.]”66
The decision to override law emerges
therefore not from the courageous and defiant will of an isolated leader
but from the dialogical nature of moral engagement.
In an essay published a decade prior to Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer
writes, “Disobedience, when it is not criminally but morally, religiously,
or politically motivated, is almost always a collective act, and it is
justified by the values of the collectivity and the mutual engagements of
its members.”67 This statement reveals early stirrings of Walzer’s
understanding of the communal foundations of political morality, a
theme which undergirds his later claims concerning supreme
emergency. This collectivity, as Walzer describes it, refers to something
more capacious and meaningful than the citizenry of a nation-state,
although the collectivity will typically take this form. Rather, the
community of persons who create obligations are a people united in the
project of constructing and sustaining culture, moral traditions, and
social order. The decision to act in violation of law, within the context of
supreme emergency, is therefore better understood as an affirmation of
the duty to sustain the collective rather than as a rejection of the
collectivity’s moral judgments reflected in law. This broader framework
within which necessity should be evaluated is lost when the subject is
considered exclusively from the perspective of legal rights.
In general, the moral life of a community does not oppose law but
rather feeds its development.
As Daniel Warner writes, “for
Walzer, . . . the experience of coming up with rules is part of the social
process in a liberal society[.]” The rules which take shape to guide a
social order “reflect the historic community and the desires of its
members.”68 Under ordinary circumstances, law is properly reflective of
the moral life of a political community. Yet, in moments of supreme

65
Martin L. Cook, Michael Walzer’s Concept of ‘Supreme Emergency’, 6 J. MIL. ETHICS 138,
146 (2007).
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Walzer, supra note 57, at 66.
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Walzer, supra note 61, at 130.
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DANIEL WARNER, AN ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 117 n.15
(1991).
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emergency, law can no longer operate as the sole determinant of just
political action. Rather, law and morality, which in ordinary time
operate in tandem, become distinct and competing sources of obligation.
Obligation to law and obligation to the moral demands of community
pull in opposite directions, and necessity pushes the axis of obligation
from the former to the latter. When thus faced with an ultimate decision
between law and morality, a leader might be called upon to side with the
latter. As Walzer writes, when moments of “evil and imminent danger”
threaten the survival of the community, the leader must “accept the
burdens of criminality here and now[]” for the sake of “our history” and
“our future[.]”69
Walzer’s claim that moments arise in which the leader must break
the law for the sake of the community is a bold assertion that demands
further consideration. What is it about the community which demands
political officials to break the law? Walzer never discusses this question
specifically, but an answer emerges from the general logic of his writings
on supreme emergency. Obligation to community holds such authority
because community, for Walzer, is ultimately prior to the law. Because
law emerges out of the moral life of the community, and is sustained and
made meaningful through its participation in the lived life of a people,
law possesses no final autonomy from the community. As such, when a
supreme emergency imperils the existence of a people, it is not only
appropriate but morally obligatory that the ruler break the law for the
sake of preserving that upon which the law depends. A community
possesses an “ongoingness[]” whose vitality cannot be contained within
law alone.70 It is important to recall in this context that supreme
emergency is a situation in which the survival of people—its
ongoingness—is threatened. Such a threat, Walzer notes, is “a loss that
is greater than any we can imagine[.]”71 It would be foolhardy in such a
situation to propose that the community perish so that its laws might be
upheld.
Viewed in this broader context, Walzer’s approach to political
necessity reveals itself to be rooted more in relationality than principle.
Put differently, Walzer approaches necessity from the perspective of the
duties persons owe rather than the rights they are owed. Walzer pushes
liberal discourse away from a procedural and substantive discussion of
WALZER, supra note 42, at 260. Walzer’s position rests on an account of the
community that is not unproblematic. He seems at points to absolutize, even sacralize, the
community in its “ongoingness[.]” In the least, it is curious to frame the situation in terms
of a leader having a moral duty to violate laws that establish the moral obligations one has
in relation to other persons. Cook, supra note 65, at 144 (emphasis omitted).
70
WALZER, supra note 45, at 43 (emphasis omitted).
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rights toward a broader conception of human relations. Walzer is not, of
course, rejecting the concept of rights in toto, but he is supplementing
liberal rights talk with a consideration of the moral duties which texture
political life. Duty is a central concept, for Walzer, because “[n]o
political theory which does not move beyond rights to duties . . . can ever
explain what men actually do when they disobey or rebel, or why they
do so.”72 The limitations of rights are most fully displayed in a supreme
emergency, during which the moral vocabulary of duties offers a fuller
account of the obligations incumbent upon a political leader. The
language of rights might be adequate to describe the ordinary
mechanism of government, but Walzer warns of the danger of
absolutizing rights in a way that obfuscates the supervening moral
obligations to community.
C. The Judgment of Law and the Ruler as Scapegoat
While moral obligation to community warrants extralegal action
during supreme emergency, the law is not ultimately defeated. Rather,
the law is upheld and, in the aftermath of supreme emergency, brings
judgment upon those violative actions taken, albeit necessarily and
rightfully, during the crisis. Walzer treats necessity as a circumstance
that justifies extralegal action but does not remove the legal prohibition.
In his refusal to make necessity the basis for overturning the legal order,
Walzer echoes Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s warning that in moments of crisis,
“The true order is completely reversed if the ultima ratio itself is
converted into a rational law, if the peripheral case is treated as the
normal, and if necessità is made a technique.”73 By upholding the norms
of legal order, even if a deviation is permitted, Walzer refuses to permit
necessity to become a principle. Even justifiable actions taken during a
state of exception must be denominated transgressive. Walzer writes
that the rules “still stand and have this much effect at least: that we
know we have done something wrong even if what we have done was
also the best thing to do on the whole in the circumstances.”74
Permitting necessity to negate law would undermine the civilizational
accomplishment of law and, even more so, defeat the moral foundations
of the social order that make law meaningful.
This retention of law’s judgment does more than prevent necessity
from becoming a freestanding normative principle. The upholding of
law also resets the moral foundations of the social order and reunites the
72
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legal and moral spheres of authority. The judgment of law pulls the
nation back within the boundedness of law and reinforces those norms
from which no escape is permitted. The judgment of law remains, for it
is this judgment that restores moral order in the aftermath of tragic
violence. While necessity allows for the possibility of transcending the
bounds of law, the judgment of law reasserts the moral limits of politics.
Through judgment, law and morality, which had occupied distinct
spheres of authority during supreme emergency, are again united.
Yet Walzer does not stop here. Legal judgment not only restores the
connectedness of law and morality but participates in the process of
political redemption. Upholding the rule makes the official who acted
out of necessity a scapegoat who bears the sins of the nation. Law makes
known these sins for, as Walzer writes, it requires that the official
“acknowledge and bear (and perhaps . . . repent and do penance for) his
guilt[.]”75 The military commander or political official who overrides the
rules of war is forced to bear the burden of having done that which was
necessary and appropriate. By targeting civilians, Walzer writes,
government officials become “murderers, though in a good cause. . . .
They have killed . . . for the sake of justice[.]”76 They have acquired
“dirty hands[]” in the pursuit of an appropriate end. 77 Such is the
paradox of acting in violation of law under conditions of supreme
emergency. That which was “necessary and right was also wrong.”78
This is the irreconcilable tension that defines the nature of supreme
emergency: it is murderous and good, violative and just, right and
wrong.
One might protest that Walzer is simply playing fast and loose with
linguistic distinctions that hold little meaning. Yet, this would miss the
point. Walzer is not trying to have his cake and eat it too. Rather, he
identifies the judgment of law upon just actions as a way of reckoning
with the tragic and paradoxical nature of politics. This response to
tragedy is ultimately inadequate. In some sense, no response to a
supreme emergency could be adequate, given that such a state of affairs,
as Gilbert Meilaender observes, offers “no moral solution[.]”79 It is
perhaps for this reason that Walzer’s tension-filled account of judgment
seemingly opens the political to the transcendent. In the ritual of
judgment and punishment, which follows supreme emergency, Walzer

Id. at 65.
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reaches after something that is religious in nature.80 The scapegoated
ruler, forced to bear deserved guilt for just deeds, is sacrificed in a ritual
that is sacred as well as legal. Even though it is law that restores
normalcy in the aftermath of supreme emergency, law alone cannot
account for the moral paradox which confronts a social order at the
limits of law.
IV. CONCLUSION: SUPREME EMERGENCY AND TORTURE
Broadly speaking, Walzer’s approach to necessity represents a third
way between the dominant lines of argument found in the torture
debate. On one hand, he rejects the claim that a principle of necessity
ought to justify extralegal actions committed by state officials. On the
other hand, he rejects an absolutist position that necessity ought to not
permit violation of foundational legal principles. In short, we might
summarize Walzer’s position as follows: there are moments when
necessity authorizes and compels officials to act contrary to law, but
necessity does not cancel law nor bring such actions within the authority
of law. Yet, Walzer ultimately seeks to offer more than a middle way
between the demands of law and necessity. This Article has argued,
rather, that by establishing law and morality as distinct loci of authority,
Walzer moves beyond the either/or approach that defines the current
torture debates. His alternative does not diminish the authority of law,
but does embed law within a multi-textured framework. In the end,
Walzer proposes that a full analysis of right action under conditions of
necessity requires taking account of the distinct yet cooperative functions
provided by legal and moral norms.
Much has been said about Walzer’s views on law, morality, and
supreme emergency. How then might his approach to these subjects
inform the debate on government-sanctioned torture under conditions of
necessity? First, Walzer’s writings on supreme emergency complicate
the idea of necessity. Supreme emergency represents a moment of
potential societal collapse, a “desperate time[]” when “our deepest
values and our collective survival are in imminent danger[.]”81
Necessity, in short, is limited to those incalculably rare moments that
threaten the foundations of the social order. Without diminishing the
horrific prospects raised by the typical ticking time bomb scenario, this
state of affairs does not meet the definition of a supreme emergency.
Necessity, for Walzer, represents a genuine existential crisis that cannot
be domesticated within ordinary politics.
80
81
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In defining supreme emergency this way, Walzer establishes “limits”
to necessity that radically circumscribe the exercise of extralegal state
violence.82 Supreme emergency is not, he emphasizes, a “permissive
doctrine.”83 In fact, far from encouraging deviation from law, “supreme
emergency strengthens rights normality by guaranteeing its possession
of the greater part, by far, of the moral world.”84 Short of reaching a
moment in which “we are face-to-face not merely with defeat but with a
defeat likely to bring disaster to a political community[,]” a political
official lacks authority to engage in actions that violate the laws of war.85
This stands in contrast to the approach taken in the ticking time bomb
scenario, which facilely invokes the language of necessity. This tendency
to normalize political necessity is reflective of a broader trend within
modernity by which “‘the state of exception . . . has become the rule[.]’”86
Supreme emergency resists such normalization of the exception.
The implications of Walzer’s position are clear though
uncomfortable: there might be moments of genuine political strife in
which a society must endure suffering and even defeat rather than
upending the legal and moral foundations of the society. Recall that
Walzer concludes the bombing of Hiroshima to have been unjust, even
though pursued to hasten the end of war and limit the number of
military casualties. Considerations such as “the speed or the scope of
victory[]” have no role in determining rightful conduct.87 The rights of
Japanese citizens, grounded in the principles governing conduct in war,
demand respect. In short, there are things that must ultimately be
valued more than mere expedience: “our civilization and morality, our
collective abhorrence of murder, even when it seems, as it always does,
to serve some purpose.”88 Walzer thus concludes that “the deliberate
slaughter of innocent men and women cannot be justified simply
because it saves the lives of other men and women.”89 Even amidst the
ravages of war, necessity must remain beyond the pale of mere
utilitarian calculation. While analogizing between innocent Japanese
civilians and the captured detainee in a ticking time bomb scenario is not
without problems, the relevant legal norm does not bind because of the
status of those whose rights it protects. It binds because it reflects the
WALZER, supra note 42, at 268.
WALZER, supra note 45, at 50.
84
Id.
85
WALZER, supra note 42, at 268.
86
GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 6 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi. Press
2006) (2003) (quoting Walter Benjamin).
87
WALZER, supra note 42, at 268.
88
Id.
89
Id.
82
83

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss4/3

Calo: Torture, Necessity, and Supreme Emergency: Law and Morality at th

2009]

Torture, Necessity, and Supreme Emergency

1611

deepest moral principles and aspirations of a society. Thus, just as the
warrant for extralegal action emerges out of the moral obligation to
community, so too do the limits placed on political action. Just as a
leader has an obligation to preserve the community for the future, so too
does the leader have an obligation to honor the inherited moral
traditions. The moral community provides the yes and the no. It
empowers as it limits. Absent supreme emergency there is no warrant
for contemplating an override of these foundational norms. The
prohibition against torture ought to be no different in this respect than
laws that prohibit the targeting of civilians.
Even as Walzer radically limits the scope of necessity, he
nevertheless maintains that there are moments in which the ordinary
authority of law is overturned. During supreme emergency, binding
principles of law give way to the dynamic demands of history, and it is
to these demands that a political official must respond. Whether under
such conditions a leader might authorize torture is a question to which,
on Walzer’s terms, we cannot give a simple answer. The answer is to be
found only in the particularities of history as they present themselves to
a community and its leaders. All the same, Walzer’s theory cannot be
taken to absolutely close off the possibility of torture.
The thrust of Walzer’s position is to reject a politics of absolutes.
“[W]hen disaster looms[]” and “the heavens are really about to fall[,]”
Walzer charges, falling back on the absolutist claim that certain actions
simply ought to never be done represents a failure to appreciate the
nature of the present evil and the tragic circumstances confronting the
polity.90 To bind necessity within such a rule is to ignore the radically
contingent and tragic nature of the moment necessity creates. Rather
than seeking an a priori principle that determines if necessity might
justify torture, Walzer suggests that the proper response is to live into
history and its vicissitudes and limitations.
A supreme emergency is a moment in which the only response
might be an “immoral” response that rejects the “normal defense of
rights[.]”91 This situation is tragic, to be sure, and one from which
society must seek rapid escape. But there nevertheless are circumstances
in which the call of history demands political officials to draw society
into complicity with the tragic potential of human affairs. The tragic
nature of the situation cannot be denied, as absolutists seek to do, nor
can the immoral response offered be negated, as sought by those offering
necessity as a legal justification. Supreme emergency is a situation for
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which no simple principled response can be offered.92 It is a moment of
“paradox” that defies our ordinary rules.93 As such, Walzer’s account of
supreme emergency pushes debate away from the question of whether
the law of necessity justifies the use of torture and pulls debate into the
moral darkness and legal silence that exists at the existential fringes of
politics: a place where the leader “knows that he can’t do what he has to
do—and finally does.”94 In a supreme emergency, “the rule of
necessity”—a rule that “knows no rules[]”—is the guiding principle for
political officials.95 To delimit in advance the content of proper action
under a ruleless rule is to deny the nature of supreme emergency. The
burden of making a decision about that which must be done falls
squarely upon the ruler in this moment.
This position will be unsatisfying to many. It offers no clear
principle of action. Yet it is precisely the quest for certainty that Walzer
resists. Instead of seeking certainty, Walzer complicates a debate that
aims in its dominant form to bind the tragic within legal rationality.
Both of the approaches outlined above avoid an encounter with what
Augustine describes as the “darkness” of “social life.” Yet, for Walzer,
the only adequate response to necessity involves wrestling with the
complexities that define the relationship between tragedy and
democratic liberalism. It is into that dark space, neither transcendent nor
pedestrian, to which the debate must move, so that we might more ably
confront what Reinhold Niebuhr describes as “the confusion which
always exists in the area of life where politics and ethics meet[.]”96
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